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For many African states, the latest iteration of Western colonialism is the
International Criminal Court. All the Court’s prosecutions have involved
African conflicts, and the continent’s initially strong support for its creation
has in recent years notably weakened. Leaders from Museveni to Kenyatta
and Zuma to Bashir have excoriated the Court for its partiality, and only a
change of government in The Gambia reversed a serious threat to quit its
jurisdiction. Under pressure from Burundi and South Africa, the African
Union has made increasingly militant noises about a mass withdrawal of
member states. How should blame be apportioned for the turbulence of
this relationship between the Court and the current generation of African
leaders? Where does it leave a continent blighted by conflict, egregious
human rights abuses and perceptions of the impunity of the ‘big man’ at
the top? A research project, funded by the British Academy, has examined
attitudes in civil society in Uganda and Kenya towards the ICC and asked
whether human rights abuses could be effectively addressed by any other
means. Researchers from three universities in Kenya, Uganda and the UK
have interviewed judges, lawyers, NGOs, journalists and others about the
ICC, domestic or regional forms of ‘justice’ (such as the putative African
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Court of Justice and Human Rights) and other transitional post-conflict
mechanisms. The findings suggest that there is a high level of frustration
with the performance of the ICC and, specifically, the Office of the
Prosecutor. The article argues that although there is no one common
denominator in the failed prosecutions, the ICC’s strategy has too often
yielded the initiative to long-serving leaders adept at retaining power and
that, while state parties see little hope of reforming the ICC and favour an
‘Africanist solution to African problems’, there is little agreement on what
form that should take. 
Key words: International Criminal Court; justice; post-conflict; rights;
colonialism; impunity
1 Introduction 
Gathering in a plush Nairobi hotel, a group of African journalists and
other civil society representatives held a one-day discussion about the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and its relationship with Africa. The
failed ICC prosecution of the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and
his deputy, William Ruto, was much debated with little surprise
expressed that the case had been brought to a premature close, with
the Office of the Prosecutor offering no further evidence. After all, in
an African setting allegations of witness intimidation shoring up
presidential impunity are not exactly news. 
The meeting considered the stance of the African Union (AU)
which, although not a signatory to the Rome Statute, nor having a
legal or institutional relationship with the ICC, has been obliged by
disaffected member states to review its relationship with the Court at
several summits. Three months after the Nairobi colloquium, the AU
approved a non-binding resolution calling for a mass withdrawal from
the ICC.1 With Kenyatta retaining power in 2017 after a violently-
disputed election; the quashing of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s conviction in
2018; and the ruling in early 2019 that the former Ivory Coast
President, Laurent Gbagbo, had no case to answer, the foothold of
the ICC in Africa has been weakened further. This, then, is an ideal
vantage point from which to shine a reflective light on the conception
and application of international criminal justice, as viewed from a
continent which has been the subject of every prosecution so far
initiated by the Court. 
While several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics
and think-tanks have explored the pursuit of legal accountability for
crimes against humanity committed in Africa, and indeed the ICC
itself has not lacked self-examination on the issue, the view from
1 Reported by Reuters Africa, 1 February 2017.
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‘ground level’ has received less attention.2 As the Kenyan Section of
the International Commission of Jurists stated, ‘[t]o date, there has
been inadequate space for reflection by local voices on the
implications of international justice in Africa and on the ICC’s
interventions specifically’.3
This article distils the findings of a British Academy-funded
collaborative research project by the Universities of Bedfordshire
(United Kingdom), Makerere in Uganda, and Nairobi, in which 30
semi-structured interviews were conducted with civil society
representatives, including judges and advocates, about the ICC and
other means of addressing the ‘impunity gap’ in Africa.4 This
ethnography was supplemented by an analysis of secondary material
around the themes of post-conflict justice and reconciliation on the
continent. On the basis of the findings, we argue that nearly two
decades of ICC intervention in Africa have failed to convince civil
society that a legal remedy for crimes against humanity lies in The
Hague. Notwithstanding this, in both Uganda and Kenya, the
inviolability of ‘big man’ impunity is increasingly being challenged.
2 Context
At the heart of this article is the pursuit of ‘justice’ which, as a
concept, deserves further interrogation. The roots of the term can be
traced back through Latin to Greek, while both the Old and New
Testaments of the Bible provide layers of interpretation.5 In the
context in which we write, there are many responses to the deliberate
infliction of violence. To put it somewhat mechanistically, at one end
of the spectrum there is ‘reciprocal mimetic violence in which
perpetrators are made to suffer, even in ways similar to what they
caused their victims to suffer’.6 At the other, there are restorative
responses which form part of a wider reconciliatory process. 
The foundation on which modern (that is, post-1945) international
courts have been based is the Nuremberg tribunals which addressed
Nazi atrocities, and we have taken that form of retributive, juridical
2 For examples, see, among others, ‘Just justice? Civil society, international justice
and the search for accountability in Africa’ (2011) International Refugee Rights
Initiative and ‘The ICC intervention in Kenya’ Chatham House, AFP/ILP 2013/01.
3 3rd Roundtable ‘Strengthening the African human rights protection mechanisms’
Mombasa, Kenya, October 2011.
4 The project has been the subject of two seminars led by the authors, in Nairobi,
Kenya, October 2016 and Kampala, Uganda, January 2017. The interviews in
Uganda for this study were conducted by Professor Archangel Rukooko of
Makerere University. In Kenya, the interviews were carried out by Joseph Kobuthi
of the University of Nairobi.
5 CF Kolbert The legal background in Justinian: The digest of Roman law – Theft,
rapine, damage and insult (1979).
6 VN Redekop ‘A post-genocidal justice of blessing as an alternative to a justice of
violence: The case of Rwanda’ in B Hart (ed) Peacebuilding in traumatised societies
(2008) 206.
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response as our starting point. Nevertheless, since we are addressing
African conflicts, we have not sought to ignore the importance of
customary interventions claimed to be more ‘culturally appropriate’ in
an African context, such as mato oput or Gacaca, particularly because
some of the interviewees have raised objections to the ICC, precisely
on the grounds that it fails to understand the African psyche, what
Lajul calls ‘the African social philosophy’.7 Issues of cultural difference
have a special relevance to the case of Northern Uganda.8 
In social science research, qualitative interviewing raises issues of
epistemology. For example, what can interviewees tell us and what do
they not reveal, or actively conceal? How do we analyse and assess
the interview data? They also confront the questioner with the difficult
question of reflexivity; in this case, a recognition that adopting a
position of detached neutrality is not appropriate in the face of
egregious human rights abuses. However, this does not imply a stance
either of support for or opposition to the ICC, nor of any
predetermined approval for arguments that ‘the law should not be an
instrument of cultural imperialism’.9 While noting the frequency of
‘discursive repertoires’10 such as ‘neo-colonial justice’, ‘Western
double standards’ and ‘race-hunting’ in some of the responses and
secondary sources, our inclination is to treat them as binary
simplicities that are as likely to hinder inquiry as to help it. 
The study has not sought to achieve an exact mathematical balance
in the opinions expressed by the interviewees, nor to disqualify
anyone because of their affiliation. The primary aim was to sample as
wide a spread of civil society views or interpretations as possible
within the time-limited scope of a modestly-funded research project.
As a disclaimer, we point out that the voices of direct victims of
atrocities are absent from this inquiry and certainly deserve to be
heard. In addition to the people interviewed in Uganda and Kenya,
two lawyers closely involved with the Kenyatta/Ruto matter were
questioned.11
7 W Lajul ‘Justice and post-LRA war in Northern Uganda: ICC versus Acholi
traditional justice system’ Paper delivered at the European Conference on Ethics,
Religion and Philosophy (2016) 3.
8 See T Allen Trial justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (2006); EK Baines ‘The haunting of Alice: Local approaches to justice and
reconciliation in Northern Uganda’ (2007) 1 International Journal of Transitional
Justice 91; A Branch ‘International justice, local injustice’ (2004) 51 Dissent 22.
9 T Kelsall Culture under cross-examination: International justice and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (2009) 258.
10 B Byrne ‘Qualitative interviewing’ in C Seale (ed) Researching society and culture
(2012) 211.
11 A full list of interviewees can be found at the end of the article.
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3 Sparring with the International Criminal Court
A plethora of explanations have been offered for Africa’s growing
disaffection with the ICC. Murithi argues that African states believe
that the ICC has singled out their continent because it dare not risk
alienating its largest financial supporters in the global community.12
Mueller suggests that initial support for the Court was strong as long
as its investigations centred on non-state actors (such as the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA)), but when the focus shifted towards former
heads of state and even serving presidents, self-preservation became
the dominant response.13
For Asaala, primary responsibility lies with the United Nations (UN)
Security Council for being ‘selective in the recognition and waiver of
immunities for international crimes in favour of the interests of its
permanent members’.14 On the other hand, Nel and Sibiya point out
that the ICC has opened preliminary investigations in Iraq, Colombia,
Afghanistan and Georgia, ‘thereby dispelling the myth that the ICC
only focuses on situations in Africa’.15
These assessments all have merit but it is undeniable that the
issuing of an ICC warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President, Omar
al-Bashir in March 2009 began the process of framing the Court as an
instrument of Western colonialism, a viewpoint summed up by The
Gambia’s then Information Minister, Sheriff Baba Bojang, who was
reported as calling the ICC ‘the international Caucasian court for the
persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans’.16
The indictment did not deter Bashir from successfully testing the
concept of immunity by visiting Nigeria for an African Union (AU)
summit in 2013 and South Africa in 2015, where the ANC-led
government countermanded a court order for his arrest. The visit
which provided the impetus for this research study was one to
Uganda in 2016, where he attended the re-inauguration of President
Museveni. At the ceremony, the Ugandan leader’s attack on the ICC
as ‘a bunch of useless people’ provoked a walkout by the ambassadors
of the United States of America and Canada.17 Like South Africa,
Uganda had once been a proponent of the ICC and, indeed, was the
first country to refer a case (that of the Lord’s Resistance Army leader,
Joseph Kony) to the Court, after it came into being in 2002. However,
12 T Murithi ‘Africa’s relations with the ICC: A need for reorientation?’ in HB Stiftung
A fractious relationship: Africa and the International Criminal Court (2012) 5.
13 SD Mueller ‘Kenya and the International Criminal Court: Politics, the election and
the law’ (2014) 8 Journal of Eastern African Studies 25.
14 EO Osaala ‘Rule of law or realpolitik? The role of the United Nations Security
Council in the International Criminal Court processes in Africa’ (2017) 17 African
Human Rights Law Journal 266.
15 M Nel & VE Sibiya ‘Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court: Does Africa
have an alternative?’ (2017) 17 African Journal on Conflict Resolution 79.
16 The Guardian 27 October 2016.
17 Variously reported in Al Jazeera, allAfrica.com 13 May 2016. 
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for those prepared to look, the signs were already there that leaders
such as Museveni saw the Court as a means to address their own
political problems rather than as a conduit to justice. Joseph Kobuthi,
a member of the civil society umbrella group, Kenyans for Peace with
Truth and Justice, goes right back to 1998 in his assessment:18
The decision to sign up to the Treaty of Rome by African heads of state
who came to power in coups in the 1980s and 1990s was quite cynical.
They saw the ICC as somewhere they could place their enemies and
political opponents.
However, Museveni has seemingly inverted that proposition. Speaking
at the first inauguration of Uhuru Kenyatta as Kenya’s President, he
congratulated Kenya’s voters for rejecting ‘the blackmail of the ICC’
which the West used ‘to install leaders of their choice in Africa and
eliminate the ones they don’t like’.19
From 2003, when Museveni referred the crimes of the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Northern Uganda to the ICC, his relationship with
the Office of the Prosecutor – then occupied by the Argentinian, Luis
Moreno Ocampo – reflects the old maxim: ‘Keep your friends close
and your enemies closer.’ Indeed, the proximity was highlighted by
the pair appearing at a joint press conference in London to announce
the referral. The Prosecutor went on to Kampala, declaring that he
would ‘interpret the referral as concerning all crimes under the Rome
Statute committed in Northern Uganda, leaving open the possibility
of investigating alleged atrocities by government forces’.20 
However, despite well-documented crimes committed by the
Ugandan army, the Uganda Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF), no soldier
was indicted by the ICC, leading to criticism that the Prosecutor had
overplayed his hand with his earlier pledge, and claims by some in the
opposition that ‘the ICC has become Museveni’s political tool’.21 
The Court of Appeal judge, Mr Justice Remmy Kasule JA, agrees that
the ICC Prosecutor made a serious misjudgment in appearing
alongside Museveni at the London press conference:22
By issuing the warrants of arrest [for Joseph Kony and other LRA leaders] in
the company of Museveni, Ocampo gave the impression that the ICC was
doing the bidding of the political leader of a country where the conflict
began. This is a picture which should not have been created. Indeed, the
situation became even more confusing later when the President stated
publicly that he was opposed to the existence of the ICC.
18 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
19 Quoted by James Verini in New York Times 22 June 2016, www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/26/magazine/international-criminal-court-moreno-ocampo-the-
prosecutor-and-the-president.html (accessed 20 March 2019).
20 P Clark ‘Law, politics and pragmatism’ in N Waddell & P Clark (eds) Courting
conflict? Justice, peace and the ICC in Africa (2008) 42.
21 As above.
22 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
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This somewhat instrumentalist conclusion illuminates one facet of a
complicated picture. There is also the principle of complementarity, a
founding tenet of the ICC, to consider. This means that if a member
state is willing and capable of carrying out prosecutions itself, the ICC
will not take precedence. A fellow Court of Appeal judge, Mr Justice
Richard Buteera JA, argues that, albeit in a limited way, this is exactly
what happened in Uganda:23
When I was Director of Public Prosecutions, some UPDF soldiers were put
on trial. In fact, on one occasion, the High Court moved the proceedings
to Kitgum [in Northern Uganda] to hear cases. Some soldiers were
convicted of murder, rape, robbery and defilement and fired from the
army. The High Court, the Uganda police and my own DPP’s office made
sure that sentences were served. So, yes, the ICC did not prosecute UPDF
perpetrators but other institutions did.
Odong Stephen, Programme Manager for Human Rights Network
Uganda (Hurinet-U), adds:24
Suppose the ICC had carried out investigations into the UPDF, would the
state have co-operated? Wouldn’t it have made evidence hard to find?
After all, look at Kenya, where evidence and witnesses gradually
disappeared until proceedings against President Kenyatta had to be stayed.
Whatever view is taken of the arrangement which underpinned the
LRA indictments, there is little doubt that President Museveni showed
a great deal of political finesse in his early dealings with the ICC.
Perhaps encouraged by his example, fellow East African President,
Uhuru Kenyatta, also demonstrated nimble footwork in forging an
alliance with his erstwhile opponent, William Ruto, to fight the 2013
elections while under indictment from the ICC. This manoeuvre was
not only well judged to discomfort the Office of the Prosecutor, but
also to subvert the notion of ‘victim-centred justice’, so central to the
ICC’s mandate. A report by the civil society alliance, Kenyans for
Peace with Truth and Justice, expressed it as follows:25
In a strange ironical reversal, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto now presented
themselves as victims, the hapless targets of an imperialistic plot against
Africans. A plot, moreover, that would ultimately undermine democracy in
Africa by blocking reconciliation efforts, such as those that the political
alliance headed by Uhuru, representing the Kikuyus, and Ruto,
representing the Kalenjins was purportedly trying to achieve. In turn, the




25 Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice ‘Impunity restored? Lessons learned from
the failure of the Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court’ 24 November
2016 5, http://kptj.africog.org/impunity-restored-lessons-learned-from-the-failure-
of-the-kenyan-cases-at-the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed 20 March 2019).
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4 Harnessing the media
In this context, becoming the first sitting head of state to stand in the
dock in The Hague was not so much a high stakes gamble as an
opportunity to shape the narrative which would play most effectively
with a domestic audience. Harnessing the power of Kenya’s highly
mediatised environment was central to a ‘Mugabe-ist strategy of
demonising critical civil society and media voices as neo-colonial “sell-
outs” and “traitors”’.26 Kwamchetsi Makokha writes a column for the
Sunday Nation:27
The approach by the Kenyatta government was to hold the trial anywhere
but in the courtroom. In other words, to make it a trial of public opinion
and, in particular, to fight the charges in our growing social media space.
We’ve got over 30 million users of mobile phones, many of them smart
phones, and it’s a space which is poorly regulated and ideally suited to
carrying snappy, emotive messages. No long boring articles in the
newspapers but a focused social media assault. Yes, there were some
newspapers and broadcast media which took the side of the ICC but the
qualitative impact of the anti-coverage was far more effective.
Despite ‘counter-currents in which a new Nairobi based “twitterati”
utilised social media to criticise Kenyatta and Ruto and defend their
prosecution’,28 the government’s social media campaign was effective
in discrediting civil society groups, according to Edigah Kavulavu,
legal officer for the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya
Section:29
These groups were seen as being in cahoots with the ICC by providing
evidence for the prosecutions and there was a very effective use of
Facebook and What’s App to undermine their credibility. What’s App is a
very good tool for spreading false rumours, for example, that some of the
witnesses were ‘fake’, in that they had been coached by Ocampo.
Thus, prefiguring the irruption of ‘fake’ news and ‘post-truth’ politics
into the lexicon of the Western democracies, Kenya’s media space also
played host to ‘pseudo’ blogs and paid-for propaganda supporting
the Kenyatta/Ruto camp and attacking the ICC, designed, according
to Kwamchetsi Makohka,
to give the impression that they had a greater level of backing than they
did. A relatively small number of people were able to make a lot of noise.
Some journalists were paid to go to The Hague to cover the trials and you
wonder where the resources came from, given that the media here is badly
cash-strapped.30
26 K Voltmer & H Kraetzschmar ‘Investigating the media and democratization
conflicts’ 2015 http://www.mecodem.eu/publications/working-papers (accessed
22 June 2017).
27 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
28 Voltmer & Kraetschmar (n 26).
29 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
30 As above.
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In the interests of balance, it should be noted that this co-opting of
journalists was not exclusive to the Kenyatta/Ruto side. A Kenyan
journalist, who wishes to remain anonymous, told the Nairobi
colloquium:
The ICC- sponsored training of journalists in Kenya, ahead of the trials, was
not just teaching us about how the court operates. It was basically a form
of advocacy journalism. It implied that any journalist who saw flaws in the
ICC prosecution was pro-impunity. I blame the prosecutor, Ocampo, for
raising expectations unreasonably.
5 Witnesses at risk
It will come as little surprise to anyone who has studied Kenya’s media
to learn that journalists are willing to accept cash for writing in
support of one political interest or another. However, it is also alleged
– although difficult to substantiate – that some parts of the media
were used by the Kenyatta/Ruto camp to reveal the names of
protected witnesses, putting their lives at risk. Ultimately, it was the
unwillingness of many witnesses to repeat in oral evidence what they
had previously told investigators in interviews which fatally
undermined the prosecution. Irene Mutile, communications officer of
the NGO Maskani Ya Taifa, says this took civil society by surprise:31 
Kenyans did not expect the case to collapse due to witnesses and evidence
disappearing. They thought maybe it would collapse for other reasons but
not witnesses disappearing. 
The ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, complained that over half the
witnesses in the case against William Ruto withdrew or retracted their
initial testimony and others were killed or bribed in the Kenyatta
case:32
The level of interference with those witnesses was a huge problem for the
OTP. Some had members of their family threatened. We were having to
protect witnesses even against their own communities and that presented
a huge challenge. 
However, the Kenyan advocate, Peter Kiriba, believes that the OTP
could have done more to anticipate this problem:33
This is a loophole that the prosecution ought to have foreseen and sealed
prior to the presentation of its case. The nature of the accused persons’
[Kenyatta and Ruto] status, capability and influence should have alerted the
OTP to a potential crisis and not have been left to chance.
The Irish barrister, Fergal Gaynor, represented victims of the 2007
post-election violence in the Kenyatta trial and in 2013 and 2014
31 Personal interview with researchers, September 2016.
32 Interview with ‘Journalists for Justice’ 21 July 2016, http://www.jfjustice.net/en/icc-
cases/icc-chief-prosecutor-shares-thoughts-on-kenyan-cases (accessed 23 February
2017).
33 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
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spent 49 days interviewing 839 of these victims. He believes that an
imaginative use of technology could have helped circumvent the
problem of witness intimidation:34
There should be less dependence by the OTP on the oral evidence of
witnesses. Where possible, investigations and prosecutions should focus on
cell phone and cell site data, including SMS messages, emails and
messages sent via What’s App, Viber and so on between those carrying out
atrocities. There’s no reasonable doubt that much of this data is already
being collected (if not analysed) by Western and other intelligence
agencies. The difficulty is to get it to the ICC. The Special Tribunal for
Lebanon has shown how billions of pieces of cell phone/cell site data can
give a precise picture of what happened during the critical hours leading
up to and including a major crime.
6 Office of the Prosecutor
Much of the criticism which followed the collapse of the Kenyatta and
Ruto cases has been directed at the Office of the Prosecutor. However,
it should be pointed out that, faced with an unwillingness to co-
operate by a state, the ICC, which has none of the resources available
to a domestic prosecutor, such as subpoenas, surveillance and
policing, is at a severe disadvantage. In the Kenyatta case, requests for
information from the Kenyan authorities went unanswered and the
Attorney-General refused to hand over telephone, land and asset
records. 
However, lawyer Gary Summers, who was part of the Kenyatta
defence team from August 2011 onwards, believes the Office of the
Prosecutor cannot escape blame for the failure of the prosecution:35
It was amateurish. You can’t just rely on human rights NGOs to find
witnesses and interview them. You needed trained investigators on the
ground in Kenya to check the sources of some of the allegations. The OTP
relied far too heavily on the report of the Waki Commission to find
witnesses. Indeed, the case against Kenyatta started with a single
informant, witness no 4. The ICC needs a prosecutor who is ruthlessly
focused on the target. This wasn’t the case with Ocampo and frankly, Fatou
Bensouda has become almost invisible.
There has been considerable criticism of Ocampo’s approach.36
Edigah Kavulavu of the ICJ, Kenya Section, supported the prosecutions
but remains disappointed by the way they turned out:37
The general mood here was that we would get justice through the ICC.
And that the Kenyan case would be an example to the rest of the world.
But attitudes began to change when the indictments did not include
Odinga and Kabaki, because their part in the PEV was well-known. The
34 E-mail from Fergal Gaynor, 12 October 2016.
35 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016. The Waki Commission was set
up by the Kenyan government in 2008 to investigate the post-election violence of
the previous year.
36 Verini (n 19).
37 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
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OTP only had a small outreach office in Nairobi, from where witnesses
were interviewed. And there was no proper profiling of victims. The OTP
based its judgments about witnesses/victims almost entirely on information
from civil society NGOs. And, when the case finally opened in court, it was
obvious that Ocampo was not trial-ready.
The ICC would argue in its defence that it achieved a historic first in
getting a sitting President (Kenyatta) into court and at least dislodged
a brick in the seemingly impregnable wall of impunity which has
shielded African leaders from legal accountability. Bemih Kanyonge is
a lawyer working for the advocacy NGO Kituo Cha Sheria (We Care
for Justice):38
Politicians in Kenya are small gods. Impunity is their modus operandi.
Seeing leading political figures, including the son of Kenya’s founding
father, in the dock at an international court humanised the political class, it
made them less invincible as they had for a long time made us believe.
Here was a super confident prosecutor insisting, day-in-day-out, that he
had enough evidence and had made adequate preparations to effectively
prosecute and provide answers for victims. At this point, impunity was
certainly on a back foot.
It should be acknowledged that, although the prosecution collapsed,
it was the catalyst for discussions leading to the setting up of an
International Crimes Division in Kenya’s High Court to make good on
the promise of complementarity. However, the insistence of the
prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, that the key factor was the retraction of
testimony by witnesses betrays a lack of robust strategic thinking by
the ICC, which may continue to put it at a severe disadvantage when
confronted by a determined state party.39
Edigah Kavulavu points out:40
The Kenyatta/Ruto government had a well thought-out strategy: to fight
the prosecution on three levels. First, to win the domestic battle of public
opinion. Then, at a regional level, to gain the support of the African Union.
And third, to lobby the UN Security Council that Kenyatta and Ruto were
democratically elected by Kenyans and that the trial would destabilise a
sensitive region of the world. Thus, by the time the prosecution collapsed,
most Kenyans were relieved because they feared serious violence if
Kenyatta and Ruto were convicted.
This strength of calculated resistance from a state party under
indictment, where ‘the government is the criminal’,41 means that the
prospects of a successful prosecution are vanishingly small. As Kenyans
for Peace with Truth and Justice point out:42
38 As above.
39 Fatou Bensouda interview, http://www.jfjustice.net/en/icc-cases/icc-chief-prosecu
tor-shares-thoughts-on-kenyan-cases (accessed 4 March 2017).
40 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016 (Kavulavu) (n 38).
41 Verini (n 19).
42 Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice ‘All bark no bite? State co-operation and
the International Criminal Court’ (2014) 24, http://kptj.africog.org/all-bark-no-
bite-state-cooperation-and-the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed 20 March
2019).
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The decisions, orders and requests of the Court can only be enforced by
national authorities. With no enforcement agency at its disposal, the ICC
cannot execute arrest warrants, compel witnesses to give testimony, collect
evidence or visit the scenes where the crimes were perpetrated, without
the acquiescence of national state authorities. 
This, of course, is where the experience of the ICC differs from that of
its ad hoc predecessors, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), mandated by the UN Security Council under chapter VII of the
Charter. Both these tribunals have been regarded as ‘successful’ in the
sense that the overwhelming majority of those indicted have been
tried and convicted. However, they were dealing with conflicts that
were over and peace processes signed by the time prosecutions took
place. By contrast, the ICC is grappling with the ongoing geo-political
turbulence of internecine and inter-state rivalries.
In Kenya’s case, the prosecutor Ocampo sought to persuade the
then President, Moi Kabaki and Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, to
voluntarily refer the post-election violence of 2007 to the ICC. He
failed and, thus, for the first time in the ICC’s history, had to use his
proprio motu powers to initiate an investigation. Was this a wise move?
Majani Tyson, a youth, governance and human rights practitioner in
Nairobi, strongly believes that it was:43
For the last few decades and even currently, massive atrocities happen
without anyone being brought to book. And if one is brought to book, it is
after massive damage that could have been avoided. Remember the
Rwandan genocide, the Darfur conflict, the Wagalla massacre [of ethnic
Somalis by Kenyan security forces in 1984] etc. All these happened due to
the decision of the international community to be bureaucratic, to sit on
the fence and wait for referral by state parties before intervening. To me,
the decision by the ICC Prosecutor to intervene in the Kenya case was a
move to encourage the international community to show a commitment
to global peace and justice.
Computer engineer Samuel K argues that
[w]hether he [the Prosecutor] used his own powers without a state referral
is not the issue. The issue is that our local politicians made the people
believe that an external court was segregating and discriminating against
them based on their ethnic affiliations. The politicians rallied behind their
ethnicity and convinced people that it was the community that was being
prosecuted and not the individual.44
7 The individual or the community?
This last insight provides a pathway to understanding one of the most
significant fault lines in the fractious relationship between the ICC and
Africa. Like the two ad hoc tribunals discussed earlier, the ICC was
established to try crimes committed by individuals rather than states,
43 Personal interview with researchers, September 2016.
44 As above.
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notwithstanding those individuals’ role in a government or a
government-sanctioned agency (the International Court of Justice
exists to mediate disputes between state parties). 
This gave expression to the principle established at the Nuremberg
tribunals that ‘state agents who authorised torture or genocide
against their own populations were criminally responsible in
international law, and might be punished by any court capable of
catching them’.45 
Thus, in prosecuting Uhuru Kenyatta, the ICC was addressing his
individual criminal liability for crimes committed during the 2007
post-election violence, not putting the state of Kenya on trial.
However, within Kenyan society Kenyatta’s individuality is intimately
bound up with a heritage of Kikuyu patrimonial obligations.
Historically, in this patron-client arrangement
there is a shared understanding of the appropriate relationship between
leaders and their communities that gave rise to complex moral economies
in which rulers were expected to provide for their followers in return for
their support.46 
In other words, in Kenya a criminal prosecution of the patron can be
presented as an attack on the clan, raising the possibility of all those
dependent on the patron being deprived of material benefits and
political influence if he is brought down. In these circumstances, it
was all too easy for the embattled Kenyatta to make a case that, as the
representative of the largest ethnic group in the country, he
embodied the nation, standing resolute against an alien, Western-
backed institution, the ICC. At the (off the record) Nairobi colloquium
cited earlier, two eminent civil society representatives made the same
point, namely, that the Kenyatta case at the ICC was the first in which
the state itself was, in effect, in the dock, and that, in these
circumstances, it would mobilise every means at its disposal to thwart
the prosecution. Neither speaker believed that the Office of the
Prosecutor fully grasped how significant this would be.
Yet, this was not a novel challenge for an international tribunal. In
the 1990s Serb politicians and military leaders, aided by a compliant
domestic media, were able to present their prosecutions at the ICTY
as attacks on Serbia itself. Katarina Ristić calls this perception a ‘hero-
defendant frame’, in which the accused is represented as ‘sacrificing
at the ICTY for the nation. Nationalist discourse transforms individual
criminal charges into collective guilt accusations, in order to reject
them as ungrounded.’47
This is what also happened in Kenya.
45 G Robertson Crimes against humanity: The struggle for global justice (1999) xiv.
46 N Cheeseman Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures and the struggle for political
reform (2015) 3.
47 ‘Media discourses on war crimes trials in Serbia’ Centre for South-East European
Studies Working Paper 2012 4 6.
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8 African solutions to an African problem?
In 2016 the trial opened in The Hague of the former LRA commander,
Dominic Ongwen, charged by the ICC with crimes against humanity.
Earlier, the possibility had been mooted by both prosecution and
defence, and counsel for the victims, of holding the first hearing in
Gulu, Northern Uganda, where the alleged crimes had taken place.
However, the judges ruled this out, citing both security and logistical
concerns. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some of those interviewed for this
study express few qualms about justice for Africa being delivered at a
distance in The Hague, there is little doubt that geographical
remoteness has given impetus to criticism of the ICC by African
leaders. The fact that the Court sits in the heart of Europe has also
reinforced the message that prosecutions of Africans are the latest
iteration of colonialism – ‘new wine in old bottles’, as it were. Hence,
it is understandable that the AU has been searching for an ‘Africanist’
solution to the challenge of human rights abuses on the continent.
In 2010 the AU Commission began a process of amending the
Constitutive Act of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights as
follows:48
[T]o expand the Court’s jurisdiction to include international and
transnational crimes. The resultant draft protocol adds criminal jurisdiction
over the international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as well as several transnational crimes, such as terrorism, piracy
and corruption.
It is beyond the scope of this study to dissect the tortuous debates at
AU summits and other plenary sessions about operationalising the
putative AU Court of Justice and Human Rights. However, the key
point of principled difference between the remit of this Court and the
ICC is the issue of immunity from prosecution for a serving leader. By
trying Uhuru Kenyatta and Laurent Gbagbo and indicting Bashir of
Sudan, the ICC has demonstrated that, in international law,
presidential impunity is dead. By contrast, the AU, meeting in Malabo,
Equatorial Guinea, in 2014, declared in a protocol that as far it was
concerned, immunity for a sitting president was very much alive.
As a consequence, few of the interviewees see an African court with
criminal powers as an adequate answer to Africa’s justice and
impunity gap. Bwana Mdogo works for the Kenyan NGO Maskani Ya
Taifa:49
Given the stance of the AU in supporting African heads of state (and their
assistants) plus its resistance and continuous threats to withdraw from the
ICC … I highly doubt the African Court would have any teeth. And who
48 M du Plessis, T Maluwa & A O’Reilly Africa and the International Criminal Court
(2013) 8.
49 Personal interview with researchers, September 2016.
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knows, given the African ‘big-man’ culture, my fears are that it could be
used to prosecute and intimidate the ‘big-man’s’ opponents. Didn’t Yoweri
Museveni call upon the ICC to help him address the Joseph Kony menace
in Uganda? Not to say that Kony should not be indicted of crimes against
humanity, but looking at African ‘big-men’, which of them shouldn’t be? 
The budget of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, once it is operational, would undoubtedly be considerably
smaller than that of the ICC, and Bemih Kanyange of Kituo Cha Sheria
believes its functional capacity would be a substantial handicap:50
Yes, the court is an option, if only it had the capacity and there was
political will to operationalise its increased jurisdiction. If that court was to
work properly, it would be the answer to the ‘African solutions to African
problems’ debate. However, as we know, that court is currently almost
entirely funded by international development partners, capable of wielding
the same influence the ICC is accused of.
Of course, this raises a number of ontological questions about what
constitutes an ‘Africanist solution’. Is it a question of geography –
where the court sits? Or, who provides the finance? After all, the
largely ‘successful’ Special Court for Sierra Leone held the Charles
Taylor trial in The Hague, with funding from only one major African
donor state, Nigeria. Yet, it was not widely decried as an
‘international’ tribunal. In the opinion of the authors, the key issue is
whether it is acknowledged in the state or region where the crimes
have been committed that a measure of accountability (sufficient or
not) has been achieved. 
In May 2016 another way forward for trying egregious crimes in
Africa came to fruition in a court in Senegal. The Extraordinary African
Chambers (EAC) convicted the former President of Chad, Hissène
Habré, of crimes against humanity, torture and rape. The international
media (at least, those organs which take an interest in matters of
justice) was euphoric.
In an editorial, the Guardian newspaper wrote that ‘[t]he trial of
Habré has been an event without precedent. Its outcome is a
watershed for human rights in Africa and beyond’.51
This unprecedented use of the principle of universal jurisdiction to
prosecute and convict the leader of one state in the courts of another
was a development which many Africans thought they would never
see. The financial contribution of the government of Chad towards
the holding of the trial, plus its cooperation with the investigating
judges during their four missions to Chad in 2013 and 2014, should
not be underestimated. It is true that it took a court order from the
UN to unblock the impasse which had mired the mooted prosecution
in procedural difficulties for the best part of a decade, and the
majority of the funding for the court process came from European
50 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
51 ‘The Guardian view on the conviction of Hissène Habré: Africa points the way’
1 June 2016 28.
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states. However, by the authors’ own accountability standard, it must
be counted as a successful African solution, not least because it was
the remarkable persistence of victims’ groups over two decades which
made the trial a reality. Their ‘reward’ was the agreement by the AU
to set up a trust fund for victims.
However, the implications of the Habré prosecution are clearly a
threat to those AU leaders who fear an indictment once they leave
power. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the EAC is a sui generis
response to the challenge of impunity rather than a viable African
alternative to the permanent blueprint offered by the ICC.
What of the much-vaunted principle of complementarity, referred
to above, and the notion of the ICC as a court of last resort? When
Moreno Ocampo first visited Uganda after the ICC came into force in
2002, he is said to have used the rather picaresque metaphor of the
new court as an aeroplane flying over the continent of Africa, only
landing if a state showed itself either incapable of or unwilling to carry
out its own prosecutions. In 2008, following the Juba Peace
Agreement between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s
Resistance Army, a war crimes division was established in the High
Court (later rebranded, when Uganda adopted the International
Criminal Court Act, as the International Crimes Division) which, in
theory, should be capable of holding trials to an acceptable
international standard. Nathan Twinomugisha was a member of
Uganda’s Amnesty Commission:52
The higher courts in Uganda, like the ICD, have a lot of credibility and I do
believe that these courts would ably handle these cases if the international
community have an interest and if they would support the ICD financially,
enabling it to offer reparations. Moreover, I don’t think there would be
pressure from the executive, as statistics show that the government loses a
higher percentage of court cases in Uganda than it wins.
A judge sitting in the International Crimes Division, Lady Justice
Elizabeth Ibanda Nahamya, agrees with that assessment, but offers a
caveat:53
If Joseph Kony was arrested in Uganda, there is no reason why he shouldn’t
be tried here, although his atrocities are more international than merely
domestic, since they spread in South Sudan and Central African Republic as
well. The problem is that we do not have sufficient resources to take off.
Besides, we are still grappling with just one case.
The one case she refers to is that of a former LRA commander,
Thomas Kwoyelo, the first trial at the International Crimes Division,
which some observers regard as a landmark test for the principle of
complementarity in Africa.54 Although Kwoyelo successfully invoked
52 Personal interview with researchers, February 2017.
53 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
54 International Justice Monitor 13 March 2017, www.ijmonitor.org/2017/03/the-
thomas-kwoyelo-case-at-the-icd-issues-of-victim-participation/ (accessed 20 March
2019).
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Uganda’s amnesty law to stop the prosecution in the lower court, the
decision was overturned by the Supreme Court and the trial has
resumed. However, it must be said that, among those interviewed for
this study – admittedly, neither a large nor necessarily representative
sample – there was no abundance of confidence that domestic justice
for war crimes and crimes against humanity would equate to fair and
impartial justice. In 2010 a group of experts wrote to the UN
Secretary-General criticising the proposition that Kenya could handle a
trial of the magnitude of Kenyatta’s. Dr Wandia Njoya is a lecturer at
Daystar University:55
Our problem isn’t a legal capacity one: It’s a political one. The politicians
have a noose around the judiciary’s neck. They’re willing to kill and
impoverish judges if they need to, and they won’t be investigated because
the police lack capacity and the politicians will rally support from their
ethnic groups.
9 Customs versus courts
Those who criticise the ICC as a neo-colonial construct imposing its
will on Africa, invariably make the case that for many cultures on the
continent a retributive version of justice is less familiar than a
reconciliatory one and, therefore, that dealing with the aftermath of
conflict requires a more mixed and nuanced approach than the thud
of a judicial gavel. The model often referred to is that of Rwanda,
which turned to the grassroots system of justice known as Gacaca,
alongside an international tribunal, to address the enormity of the
1994 genocide. 
However, it sometimes is overlooked that Gacaca was an
instrumental solution to a practical problem, namely, that an
antiquated prison system was incapable of accommodating even a
fraction of the tens of thousands of perpetrators. In Northern Uganda
another customary practice, mato oput, has been championed as a
more culturally acceptable alternative to the ICC. The ritual involves
the sharing of a bitter liquid (oput) and a slaughtered animal, usually a
sheep, by two sides in conflict, to seal reconciliation, although not
necessarily forgiveness. It has been practised sporadically in the Acholi
tribal territories for many generations, although opinions differ as to
how widely used it is today and for what kinds of disputes. 
However, there are important differences between Rwanda and
Uganda. The latter is both far less centralised and far more ethnically
diverse, and, whereas the genocide was confined to Rwanda itself, the
Lord’s Resistance Army has at various times left its imprint in South
Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as in Northern
Uganda. Thus, Tim Allen of the London School of Economics, who has
lived in Northern Uganda for several periods, argues that an Acholi-
55 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
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inspired practice would not be suitable for addressing the trans-
national crimes committed by the LRA.56 
The Ugandan judge, Lady Justice Elizabeth Ibanda Nahamya, is not
so dismissive of mato oput:57
It is not quite true that mato oput is specific to one region. It is also used in
West Nile and Soroti, alongside other traditional justice methods to deal
with all kinds of crime. But these methods cannot be equated with the ICC.
Our problem in Uganda is that we have not wholly embraced informal
justice. If we were to integrate it into our justice system, I believe it would
be as effective because all these methods are meant to act as social
controls.
Her judicial colleague, Mr Justice Remmy Kasule, argues that the
retributive basis of an ICC prosecution is no different from that
practised by Uganda’s criminal justice system and, therefore, is widely
understood, if not embraced. However, he reinforces the conceptual
point made earlier that the mechanism of international criminal justice
is at odds with the customary process:58
Mato oput as a trial system is more intended to establish collective guilt [of
a community or clan] rather than individual guilt, unlike the ICC, where the
charges and trials are of specific individuals. Traditionally, in mato oput it is
the community that says ‘we have done wrong’ and every member, both
individually and collectively, shares that wrong. However, where mato oput
can be of value is after trial and sentencing, when the convicted person can
be called on to show amends to the community.
The LRA delegation at the peace talks in Juba in 2007 favoured the
incorporation of traditional justice methods into the formal Ugandan
judicial system and for the government to challenge the jurisdiction of
the ICC.59 It would require deeper inquiry to establish whether the
championing of mato oput has broader support, but recognising that
opinion is sharply divided about the respective merits and applicability
of modern criminal justice mechanisms and traditional justice in
Northern Uganda, Lajul, who has Acholi heritage, argues for a
melding of the two approaches, and proposes
a type of justice that harmonises other than polarising the communities
that have suffered for more than two decades. This theory is centred and
guided by the view that crime that breeds injustice is more than a personal
affair, it is as well a social affair.60
However, this middle way would require a paradigm shift in
jurisprudential thinking at the ICC, and there is no sign that this is
about to happen.
56 T Allen ‘Ritual ab(use)? Problems with traditional justice in Northern Uganda’ in
N Waddell & P Clark (eds) Courting conflict? Justice, peace and the ICC in Africa
(2008) 47.
57 Personal interview with researchers, October 2016.
58 As above.
59 Allen (n 57) 51.
60 Lajul (n 7) 2 (our emphasis).
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10 Conclusion
In the true spirit of objective ethnography, this inquiry has eschewed
a priori assumptions in favour of empirical observation. The
conclusions to be drawn from the interviews are several and do not
necessarily form a consistent pattern. Most of those representing what
can loosely be described as human rights NGOs have argued that, for
the health of society a measure of juridical accountability is necessary
in order to challenge the perceived impunity of leaders and,
moreover, that victims of post-conflict violence have been left on the
margins of any debate about the ICC and Africa. Most believe that in
theory the international criminal approach is better placed to deliver
justice than domestic mechanisms because courts in Uganda and
Kenya are less likely to demonstrate a robust independence from the
executive. There is a similar scepticism about the potential
effectiveness of a regional African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
Perhaps understandably, the judges interviewed have more faith in
the courtroom than do other sectors of civil society.
Scepticism turns to cynicism when questions are asked about the
dealings of leaders, such as Museveni and Kenyatta, with the ICC. The
consensus is that domestic political advantage is the priority for
governing parties rather than a genuine commitment to addressing
the results of conflict and human rights abuses. There is widespread
dismay at the strategy and assumptions of the ICC, particularly of the
first Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, in allowing forseeable obstructions,
such as witness intimidation, to undermine prosecutions. The failure
of the Court to do more to acknowledge perceptions of remoteness
and neo-colonialism is also keenly felt on the continent. 
The final thought concerns the case for African ‘exceptionalism’.
The haemorrhaging of support for the ICC may eventually lead to an
AU-mandated court assuming responsibility for prosecuting human
rights abuses. This would be a blow to the global remit of the ICC,
especially if the principle of presidential immunity is maintained.
However, it should never be forgotten that the ICC is a court of last
resort and, in the spirit of complementarity, any means of redress for
those who suffer egregious violence and abuse is surely better than
none. Many of those interviewed for this study can be described as
civil society gatekeepers, articulate and generally well-informed about
the issues under scrutiny. What is perhaps even more urgent is to drill
down further and speak to those whose lives have been irreparably
scarred by man’s inhumanity to man.
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